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A Novel Dynamic Key Management Scheme for Secure Multicasting 
Junqi Zhang’, Vijay Varadharajan’, and Yi Mu2 
Department of Computing, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia 
School of Information Technology and Computer Science, 
University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia 
Abstract-We pmpose a new secure multicast scheme based 
on a novel hybrid key distribution scheme. This scheme meets the 
requirements described in the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) for multicast security architecture. It exhibits certain 
unique advantages in security services over existing schemes in 
the area of dynamic gmup key management. Our scheme allows 
efficient mechanisms for group members to join and leave a 
group frequently. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In  multicasting, a message is sent from one party to many 
recipients, or from many recipients to many recipients[l]. 
Internet Protocol (IF’) Multicasting was first proposed and 
specified in the 1980s. Since the creation of the Mbone in 
1992, the interests in IF’ Multicast has been expanding rapidly. 
This is because multicasting enables the desired applications 
to service many users without overloading a network and 
resources in the server. In general, multicast applications can 
include both real-time and non-real-time applications which 
may involve data and multimedia. 
Security is essential for data. transmission over public 
networks. As defined in IS0 7498[2], there are several facets 
to security: confidentiality, integrity, access control, authen- 
tication, non-repudiation, and auditing and accountability. 
There are several pmtocols widely used to address the unicast 
security issues, hut often they may not be directly extended 
to a multicast environment. Multicasting introduces some 
distinct security issues differing to unicast [3][41[5] . First, in 
general multicasting is more vulnerable than unicast, because 
transmissions occur over many network channels. A more 
difficult issue arises due to the multicast gmup membership 
being usually dynamic. Users can leave and join the groups, 
thus making the issue of group management a significant 
challenge in large scale systems. Also we need to ensure 
forward and backward secrecy. Forward secrecy implies that 
whenever a member of a gmup leaves the group, she  must 
he prevented from having further access to the data and keys 
of that multicast group. Backward secrecy requires that the 
data communicated within a group before a new member 
or members join must remain secret to the new member or 
members. Other multicast security requirements include “ I  
affects all” scalability and data source authentication. The 
former requirement implies that the addition or removal of 
one or more members from a gmup should not affect other 
members of the gmup. The latter addresses the situation where 
an adversary or a group member poses as a member or another 
member of the group in sending the data. This requires group 
member authentication and data origin authentication. 
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Several schemes have been proposed for secure multi- 
casting over the recent years, which can be classified into 
three categories [4][6][7]: centralized flat schemes, distributed 
flat schemes, and hierarchical schemes. Specific ones include 
manual key distribution, painvise keying, hierarchical trees, 
secure lock, distributed registration and Key Distribution 
(DiRK)[Xl[9][5]. We will give a brief analysis of these 
schemes in Section 5 and compare them with our new scheme 
proposed in this paper. 
In this paper, we present a novel secure multicast schemes 
based on a novel hybrid key distribution scheme. It provides 
dynamic group key management service that allow group 
members to join and leave a group frequently. Furthermore 
our scheme is able to address data origin authentication and 
group member authentication without introducing specific 
additional mechanisms. The rest of this paper is organized 
as follows. Section 2 introduces the LETF multicast security 
architecture reference framework[lO]. Section 3 presents our 
key distribution scheme. Section 4 proposes our new securing 
multicasting scheme. Section 5 compares our scheme with the 
previously proposed schemes. Finally, section 6 provides the 
concluding remarks. 
11. MULTICAST SECURITY ARCHITECTURE REFERENCE 
FRAMEWORK 
This section reviews briefly the multicast security architec- 
ture reference framework proposed by the Internet Engineer- 
ing Task Force (LEIF)[IO] [I l l .  
A. Reference Framework 
A schematic representation of the Draft Multicast Security 
Reference Framework is shown in Figure 1. This framework 
is used to classify and specify the functional areas, functional 
elements (represented by the boxes), and their interfaces 
(represented by the arrows). 
There are three sets of functional entities and three func- 
tional areas. The three sets of functional entities are the Policy 
Server, Group Controller and Key Server (GCKS), Sender and 
Receiver. The policy server provides functions to create and 
manage security policies specific to a multicast group. The 
Group Controller and Key Server (GCKS) provides functions 
relating to the management of cryptographic keys used by a 
multicast gmup. 
Based on the number of senders, multicast is divided into 
two types, I-to-N and M-to-N. In a 1-to-N multicast, only one 
sender can transmit data to a group. In a M-to-N multicast, 
multiple (or all) group members can transmit data to a group. 
The three functional areas are multicast data handling, 
group key management, and the multicast security policies. 
Multicast data handling covers issues concerning the 
security-related treatment of multicast data by the sender and 
the receiver. Typically, the data is encrypted by a group key 
and authenticated to a multicast group. The data encryption 
mainly addresses the issue of confidentiality. The data authen- 
tication takes two flavors; (1) source authentication and data 
integrity, (2) group authentication, which guarantees that data 
was generated by some group member. 
Group key management is concerned with the secure distri- 
bution and refreshing of keying material. The keying material 
refers to the cryptographic key belonging to a group, the state 
associated with the keys and the other security parameters 
related to the keys. The problems that should be addressed 
include: (I) member identification and authentication, (2) 
verification of the membership to groups, (3) establishment 
of a secure channel between a GCKS entity and the member, 
(4) establishment of a long-term secure channel between one 
GCKS entity and another, (5) the changing of keys and keying 
material, and (6) detection of signaling failures and perceived 
compromises to keys and keying material. 
The multicast security policies provide aspects of policy 
in the context of multicast security and must provide the 
rules for operation for the other elements of the Reference 
Framework. These include the policy creation, high-level 
policy translation, and policy representation. 
POLICY 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Security Policy Management area along the interface between 
Key Servers and Policy Servers. 
AUTHORIZATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
C. Group Key Management Architecture 
Group Key Management is one of the main aspects of 
securing multicast. The aim of a group key management 
protocol is to provide the group members with the up-to-date 
security association. The Group Security Association Model is 
shown in Figure 2. The Group Key Management Architecture 
consists of three protocols: the Registration Protocol, the Re- 
key protocol, and the Data Security protocol. The Re-key 
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Fig. 1. M u l t i c ~ ~ t  Security Architecture Reference Framework 
B. Security Service 
Several security services are specified for the interfaces of 
Figure 1. The three security services - multicast data confi- 
dentiality, multicast source authentication and data integrity, 
multicast group authentication - are placed in the functional 
area of Multicast Data Handling along the interface between 
Senders and Receivers. Two security services - multicast 
group member management and multicast key management - 
are placed in the Group Key Management Area. One security 
service - multicast policy management - is placed in the 
Fig. 2. The Group Security Association Model 
There are two types of gmup key: the KEK (key-encrypting 
key) and the TEK (traffic-encrypting key). The KEK maybe 
a single key that encrypts the TEK or a vector of keys that 
encrypts the TEK and other TEKs. The KEK is established 
by the Registration Protocol and used by the re-key protocol. 
The TEK is established by the Re-key Protocol and is used 
by the Data Security Protocol to protect streams, files or other 
data sent and received by the Data Security Protocol. 
The IETF Group Key Management architecture also pro- 
vides an implementation diagram. There are several functional 
blocks to implement the group key management. One is the 
GKM (Group Key Management) functional block that is used 
to establish the GSA (Gmup Security Associations) to use the 
Registration Protocol and the Re-key protocol. Another one 
is the CONTROL function that directs the GCKS to establish 
a group (including “join or leave”). CONTROL includes the 
authorization subject to Group Policy. CONTROL maybe a 
telephony signal protocol like SIP. CONTROL could perform 
the announce functions that can direct group key management 
using the application programming interface (MI). The third 
functional block is the SECURITY PROTOCOL function that 
protects the data transmission. It may span inter-networking 
and application layers. Other function blocks are specific to 
the operating system (OS), databases such as Security Policy 
Database (SPD) and Credential Stores (CRED). 
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111. KEY GENERATION ALGORITHM 
Our approach involves the proposal of a dynamic group 
key management scheme that enables secure and,. efficient 
updating of group members. We achieve this by constructing 
a public key that is associated with several associated private 
keys. Our proposal for secure multicasting is based on our 
earlier work on key distribution described in [12]. 
A. Preliminaries 
The security of our scheme is based on the difficulty of 
computing discrete logarithms, and the protocols are based 
on the polynomial functions and a set of exponentials. 
Let p be a large prime, Z; he a multiplicative group of 
order q for qlp - 1, and g E Z, for i = 0,1,2,  ..., n be a set 
of integers. A polynomial function of order n is constructed 
as follows: f(x) = n:="=,z - zi) C:=,aixi modq, 
where the ai are coefficients: a0 = n y = , ( - x j ) .  a1 = 
C:=l(-zj), a, = 1. Note that f(q) = c:=,aiz; = 0. We 
can use this property to construct a broadcasting encryption 
system. 
Having the set [ai}, we can then construct the correspond- 
ing exponential functions, 
n:+j(-z3),..., an--2 = c:#i(-zi)(-zj), an-1 = 
{g"",g"',g"',.. ., sa"} = {90,91,g2,...,gn) 
B. System Setup 
keys is done as follows: 
The construction of the encryption keys and decryption 
. Select n distinct random numbers xi E Z, for a = 
1 ,2 , .  . ' ,  n, which form a set X, and a subset X, C X,. . Compute A = n;=,(n:I;g?) modp. Note that A is 
computed once only. We will see later, a dynamic further 
updates of the system do .not require re-computation of 
A. . Select an integer b E Z, and compute its multiplicative 
inverse b-' such that bb-' = 1 modq. . Compute Zi = b-' En . zn modq, for j = 1,2,  _.., n. . Compute ij = s j x y ,  where sj = sish.. . s i .  
sjs: modq = s i .  (s j ,s:  E Zq),  and SI 1s: for V i , j .  
These values satisfy the equality: 
AS 9 sbz,ge', = 1, 
%#3 ' 
V j  t [I,", . . . ,n}. 
A is kept by the authorized server and will he used as the 
encryption key. Since the encryption key is not public, there 
is no need for us to protect it against any illegal modification. 
Zj and 4 are given to user j as its secret decryption key 
during the process of its registration. Hence the private de- 
cryption key doublet is ( E j .  s). Please note that computation 
of A is a one-time task. The server does not need to modify 
it during a system update. This is an important feature, since 
it makes the encryptioddecryption processes very efficient (a 
maximum of 2 or 3 exponential computations). 
C. Broadcasting Encryption Protocol 
The encryption key A is used to encrypt a session key that 
is then used to encrypt a message. All members in the group 
can decrypt the session key and then decrypt the message 
individually with their private keys. Let us suppose that M is 
the message to he encrypted and k is a session key. 
The protocol is as follows: 
Select an integer T ER Z,. . Compute tj = gaT and cj = gsbr, 
Compute the ciphertext c = E k ( M )  and k' = kA"', 
where Ek( . )  denotes a symmetric key encryption func- 
tion. . Broadcast the 4-tuple (B, cj, c,  k') to all subscribers. 
To decrypt the session key, the user j computes k'jx~g'~ = 
k.  k is then used for the decryption of the message. 
Iv. OUR NEW SECURE MULTICAST SCHEME 
In this section, we present our new multicast scheme for 
I-to-N multicasting. The GCKS can act as the sender. We 
concentrate only on the group key management protocol and 
then discuss the security aspects. 
A. Key Registration 
The group establishment ladder diagram is shown in Figure 
3 [13][12]. Because our scheme involves only I-to-N multi- 
casting, the sender can act as the controller or the GCKS. The 
protocol shows how a potential member registers and gets the 
member key ( Z j ,  % j ) .  
Fig. 3.  The Group Establishment Ladder Diagram 
The first phase involves a potential member requesting to 
join the group. The GCKS processes the Request to Join (RTJ) 
and then establishes the Security Associations (SA). Another 
mechanism is for the GCKS to invite a prospective member 
to join the group. The invited prospective member responds 
to the invitation, and the GCKS processes the response and a 
agreement is achieved. 
The second phase is the key distribution. After the GCKS 
and the potential member make an agreement, they can use 
the secure channel such as the Psec  or TLs/SSL to transmit 
the secret private key to the member. 
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B. Re-Keying 
To remove a member, the GCKS docs not need to re- 
constmct thc cncryption key A. Instead, the GCKS only 
recomputes s such that s!, does not include the member to he 
removed; the computation is s = CL,,tZ,s: . We can still 
use the protocol above without any modification. 
To add new members to the group, the GCKS makes use 
of an element in the spare set X, - X,. Recall that we have 
assumed that the actual number of members is less than the 
total set. That is, m < n or X, < X,. Hence to add a new 
member, the GCKS just simple moves one unused element 
from X,, - X, to X,. 
C. Security Keys 
As mentioned in section 2, we have two types of group key: 
the KEK and the TEK. KEK is used for the re-keying protocol 
and the TEK is used for the data transfer security protocol. 
In this scheme, there are two ways to encrypt the data. The 
GCKS with the encryption key (A) acts as both KEK and 
TEK. In the re-keying protocol, the GCKS recomputes s for 
an updale of the group. 
One can also adopt a hybrid approach. The GCKS’s en- 
cryption key is used for the KEK. The GCKS generates a 
symmetric key as the TEK to encrypt the message to he 
transmitted. The message to he transmitted is encrypted with 
the TEK that is encrypted with the KEK, and is then sent 
to the assoicated members. The members can decrypt it with 
their own private key to get the session key TEK, and then 
use it to decrypt the cipher message. 
D. Security Services 
As discussed in section 2, the security services are placed 
in three areas. Three of them are placed in the multicast data 
handling area. They are the Multicast Data Confidentiality, 
Multicast Source Authentication and the Multicast Group 
Authentication. Our scheme uses the asymmetric distributed 
encryption system; that is, the sender or the members use 
the asymmetric key. Hence we achieve Multicast Source 
Authentication and the Multicast Group Authentication. The 
data is encrypted by the sender’s private key, and only 
qualified members can decrypt it, and hence the Multicast 
Data Confidentiality is also ensured. 
Additional security services in the group key management 
area include the Multicast Group Member Management and 
the Multicast Key Management. In our scheme, the GCKS 
manages the group members and the asymmetric encryption 
key system, which makes the provision of both these services 
efficient. 
V. COMPARISON OF OUR PROPOSED SECURE 
MULTICASTING SCHEME WITH PREVIOUS SCHEMES 
There are several existing secure multicasting schemes. As 
we mentioned before, it can he divided into I-to-N and M- 
to-N multicast. The existing key distribution scheme can he 
divided into scalable and non-scalable protocols. The scalable 
key distribution protocols can he classified as two categories: 
the Flat scheme and the Hierarchical scheme [4][61. In this 
section, we introduce these schemes briefly and then compare 
our proposed scheme with those schemes. 
The flat scheme can be further classified as Centralized 
Flat schemes and Distributed Flat schemes. Centralized Flat 
Schemes use a single entity to distribute encryption key to 
all group members. When a prospective member joins or 
leaves the group, the group key controller transmits the new 
session key (TEK) to all members using the secure channel. 
Examples of this type of schemes are ETM [141, GKMP[lS], 
PDKD [I61 and CFKWDMG[l’I][lS]. In the GKMP (Group 
Key Management Protocol), the GCKS shares the traffic 
encryption key (TEK) and the key encryption key (KEK). 
In the ETM (Elements of Trusted Multicasting), the GCKS 
sends the encrypted multicast data, and then sends the TEK 
encrypted with the group members public key. The PDKD 
(Perfectly Secure Dynamic Conference Key Distribution) uses 
a secret share scheme for secure group data transmission. The 
group members compute a common key and any member can 
identify any other member. In the CFKM-DMG (Centralized 
Flat Key Management for Dynamic Multicast Group), the 
GCKS assigns the binary IDS to all members of the group 
and then generates and 2W KEKs, where W is the number of 
hits in any member’s ID. There is a TEK for all the memhers 
of the group. 
Distributed Flat Schemes trust all the members equally; 
the new member can get the encryption key from an earlier 
joined member and there is no GCKS or manager. There is 
a distributed version of CFKM-DMG (Centralized Flat Key 
Management for Dynamic Multicast Group)[l7]. 
The Hierarchical scheme uses a distribution tree to dis- 
tribute the session key. It can he further classified into 
hierarchical node based protocols and hierarchical key based 
protocols. Hierarchical node based schemes use a hierarchy 
of the nodes to address the scalability issue. Some of this 
type schemes are SMKD[lYl, Iolus[20] and DEP[ZIl. SMKD 
(Scalable Multicast Key Distribution) protocol uses the Core 
Based Tree (CBT) architecture for the key distribution, The 
primary core generates the TEK and the KEK, and then 
distributes these keys to the secondary core and subsequently 
to other nodes as they become part of the distribution tree. 
Iolus proposed the idea of hierarchical subgroup for scalable 
secure multicasting. The GCKS distributes the secret key to 
the top-level subgroup. The group security agents (GSA) share 
a secret key with each of their subgroup members. These 
secret keys act as the KEK. The TEK is distributed with 
the multicast data. DEF’ (Dual Encryption Protocol) also uses 
the hierarchical subgroup of multicast members to address 
scalability. 
The hierarchical key based scheme uses a hierarchical of 
key to deal with scalability. Examples of this type of scheme 
include CTKM[22] and OlT[23]. In CTKM (Centralized 
Tree-base Key Management) scheme, multicast group mem- 
bers are leaves of the key distribution tree of an arbitrary 
degree. The internal nodes of the tree represent a KEK. 
Members share the KEK with the group manager. In the OFT 
(One Way Function Trees) scheme, each internal node has 
two children. Each node has a blind version of its key that is 
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computed with the one-way function. The GCKS generates 
the blinded kcy, and the members can compute the rest of the 
key. 
The comparison of the secure multicast schemes is shown 
in table 1. 
.* " I 
TABLE I 
COMPARISON OF THE SECURE MULTICAST SCHEMES.  n: NUMBER OF 
MEMBERS, 1:  NUMBER OF SUBGROUPS, d:  DEGREE, e: SIZE OF THE 
SENDER'S SUBGROUP. 
I I I 
An important feature of our scheme is the ''I affects 
n" scalability. In our scheme, members joining or leaving 
the group do not affect other members at all. This is a 
significant issue both in terms of scalability and dynamic 
group management. This is also advantageous for the sender 
because s h e  needs to do much fewer encryption computations 
and send fewer messages. Furthermore, it greatly simplifies 
the KEK transfer process. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have presented a new secure multicast scheme based 
on a novel key distribution scheme. Our scheme possesses 
several new features that are significant in dynamic gmup key 
management. It enables efficient joining or leaving of group 
members without affecting the rest of the group members. 
This is an important characteristic when it comes to large scale 
systems involving several millions of users. Our scheme is 
computationally efficient, since it involves a relatively few (2 
or 3) encryptioddecryption operations per update. We believe 
that the pmposed scheme is in general applicable to many 
other multicasting applications. 
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